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Judges of course know that in the 1966 case of Miranda v.Arizona,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that aconfession cannot be admitted into evidence unless a
waiver of the Miranda rights (the rights to remain silent, to
avoid self-incrimination, to obtain legal counsel before and
during police questioning, and to obtain free legal counsel if
indigent) is made “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,”
and that the 1967 ruling in the case In re Gault2 extended these
protections to juveniles. It is well known, too, that there is a
substantial body of case law and commentary addressing fac-
tors courts need to consider in evaluating whether a juvenile
or adult’s waiver of Miranda rights was valid.3
What is less well known by judges is to how assess the con-
fession. Experts are often relied on to help understand the psy-
chological factors relevant to a Miranda waiver. In particular,
experts provide guidance into the voluntariness and the valid-
ity of a confession. 
Expert testimony is generally of two types.  The first involves
an explanation of the psychologically coercive nature of either
interrogations in general or the interrogation of the specific indi-
vidual.  Such testimony explains how interrogations can lead to
false or unreliable statements.  Oftentimes the testimony
involves a discussion of relevant research on the “science” of
false confessions.  In this type of expert testimony, the defendant
is not typically evaluated because that expert is not a forensic
clinician, someone who can assess the particular defendant’s
confession rather than only talk about confessions in general.
A second type of testimony is more defendant focused,
addressing the specific interrogation and how it can produce a
false confession.  The expert—ordinarily a clinical psycholo-
gist or other type of mental health professional—not only
reviews the interrogation itself but also conducts a psycholog-
ical evaluation on the defendant to assess whether there are
particular psychological characteristics that place him or her at
greater risk than others of providing unreliable or false infor-
mation in light of the interrogation tactics used.  As is the case
when determining the validity of other aspects of a Miranda
waiver, whether a confession is deemed true or false is assessed
by the trier of fact and decided on the “totality of circum-
stances” standard.
The increasing use of mental health testimony in alleged
false-confession cases is likely due in part to more scientific
research in the area, more extensive attorney training, anecdo-
tal data from highly publicized cases (e.g., Central Park Jogger
case), as well as data collected  from the Innocence Project.4
The Innocence Project estimates that individuals had falsely
confessed or provided incriminating information in approxi-
mately 25% of cases.5 Another study from Gross and Shaffer6
examined a larger sample of exonerations in a joint project
from the University of Michigan Law School and the Center of
Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of
Law. Out of 873 exonerees, 15% had confessed to their alleged
crime (25% if only looking at homicide crimes). 
Confessions and self-incriminating statements produced
during police interrogations carry great weight with the trier of
fact and become crucial components in the State proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
offense.  Leo7 reports that 80% of suspects waive their rights,
while Wrightsman and Kassin8 detail how confessions are pro-
duced in 50% of criminal cases and are challenged in court in
20% of cases.  Although this research is now nearly 20 years
old, it is this author’s personal experience that in cases in
which a defendant goes to trial, the confessions are challenged
at an even greater rate today. 
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In 2004, Drizen and Leo9 analyzed 125 cases of proven false
confessions in the United States between 1971 and 2002. A
total of 63% of false confessors were under the age of 25, and
32% of this sample were juveniles. Tepfer, Nirider, and Tri-
carico10 analyzed 103 exonerees throughout the country who
were implicated in crimes before their 20th birthdays.  All but
four of the cases involved murder and/or a sex offense.  Analy-
sis showed 31% of these youth falsely confessed.    This data
also strongly suggested that younger children are more likely
to falsely confess than older children in that 69% of 11–14-
year-olds falsely confessed, compared to 38% of 15-year-olds,
19% of 16-year-olds, and 43% of 17-year-olds.  Youths aged 18
and 19 falsely confessed at a rate of 15%.  It is not known why
there was a spike in the 17-year-old group.  These data are con-
sistent with the Gross and Shaffer study that showed of those
exonerated juveniles 11-14 years of age, 74% falsely con-
fessed, and of those 15-17 years of age, 34% falsely confessed.11
Although there have been many documented false confes-
sions in recent years, it is impossible to determine the rate of
false confessions.  This is because the police usually keep no
tally of the number of suspects interrogated annually, and, of
those departments that do, no data are kept concerning per-
centages that result in a true confession, no confession, or a
false confession.  A suspect, despite law enforcement claims to
the contrary, may even deny having confessed in the first place.
In addition, a true confession may also later be retracted by the
defendant.  As this author has written previously, a confession
is often not true or false in a dichotomous fashion.12 There are
varying degrees of truth regarding a particular confession.
Even an essentially true confession can be challenged in court
if an aspect of that confession erroneously places the defendant
in a more incriminating light than what actually transpired.  
It would seem that the percentage of juveniles who falsely
confess, particularly in cases that are tried in juvenile court, is
an underestimation of those percentages described in the exon-
eration studies.  Youths who are tried in juvenile court likely
confess at substantially higher rates than adults because these
false confessions will remain undiscovered.  Particularly if the
charges are not serious and/or the penalties not severe, cases
are less likely to be appealed.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that
a juvenile wrongly convicted in juvenile court will ever have
his conviction reversed based on DNA testing, which is
unlikely to have been performed.  This is consistent with the
relatively low 3% false-confession rate among both juvenile
and adult exonerees who were charged with nonviolent crimes
as reported in the Gross and Shaffer study.13
Defense attorneys have used
mental health professionals to sup-
press incriminating statements at
the pretrial level when the volun-
tariness of a confession is ques-
tioned.  In Crane v. Kentucky,14 the
Supreme Court held that a confes-
sion’s reliability may also be chal-
lenged at trial, even if the confes-
sion had been initially deemed voluntary. Mental health
experts have routinely been used in these cases as well.
The use of expert testimony in alleged false- or coerced-con-
fession cases, both by defense attorneys and usually by prose-
cutors as rebuttal, are fraught with a number of pitfalls or diffi-
culties in the evaluative techniques used and the testimony
proffered. One difficulty is the expert being unaware of inter-
rogative techniques that are usually used and the reasons why
an individual may falsely confess.
INTERROGATION PROCEDURES
In a disputed confession case, an assessment needs to con-
sider the specific methodology of the interrogation in question
as well as the types of interrogation procedures used by law
enforcement in general. The Reid Technique15 is the most
widely used method in the United States to extract confessions
from those individuals law enforcement believes are guilty of
the offense.  This technique is a nine-step process to obtain a
confession.  Simply described, it is one in which police con-
front the suspect with the knowledge that they know he or she
was the person who committed the crime.  Police then present
two hypotheses to the suspect as to why the crime was com-
mitted.  One of the hypotheses helps the suspect justify or
excuse the crime, perhaps by affixing moral blame on an
accomplice or the victim, or by emphasizing the suspect’s
impaired mental state.  The other hypothesis is that the suspect
is some type of evil person or monster who intended to cause
the harm.  The suspect’s denials of guilt are handled, objections
are overcome, and the police prevent the suspect from emo-
tionally withdrawing from the situation at hand.  The police
give the suspect a chance to choose what he or she thinks
would be the more acceptable or morally blameless explana-
tion for the crime.  Eventually a confession is obtained.  
Drizen and Leo16 describe the pathways to a false confes-
sion. It begins with what they term as the Misclassification
Error, in which law enforcement uses behavioral analysis to
make what they believe to be a determination whether a sus-
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pect is guilty or innocent.  Often
described as part of the pre-inter-
view, a properly trained detective
acts as human lie detector
whereby the suspect’s verbal
(e.g., word choice), nonverbal
(e.g., posture, eye contact), and
paralinguistic (e.g., response
length and delivery) behaviors
are analyzed to assess guilt.  For
example, an overly anxious,
slouching, and guarded suspect shows characteristics suppos-
edly indicative of deception and guilt. Research that examines
the validity of these factors, however, does not support this
behavioral-analysis approach as a reliable means of assessing
deception.17 Law enforcement is no more accurate (56%) than
lay people (54%) in assessing deception;  police, however, are
more certain of the accuracy of their assessments.  For both
groups, distinguishing between truth tellers and liars was not
markedly better than chance accuracy.
A second pathway is what Drizen and Leo18 term the Coercion
Error, whereby using the Reid technique, law enforcement uses
psychologically coercive means aimed at attacking a suspect’s
individual vulnerabilities as described above. The third pathway,
the Contamination Error, misleads the suspect by presenting false
evidence that does not exist and/or providing details of the
offense to the suspect that only the true culprit would know.19
A new approach for interviewing suspects is the PEACE
approach: Planning and Preparation, Engage and Explain,
Obtain an Account, Closure, and Evaluation.20 PEACE was
designed to have interviewers ask questions to establish the
truth, obtain reliable and accurate information, act fairly, and
be open-minded.  Acting fairly and being open-minded regard-
ing a suspect’s guilt are not trademarks of the Reid technique.
In fact, the PEACE approach was designed to be a non-
accusatory means of obtaining a confession. In England and
Wales, 120,000 officers have been trained in the PEACE
approach following some high-profile, false-confession cases.
There has been a pilot project in training officers in the PEACE
approach in the Canadian province of Newfoundland and
Labrador.21 In contrast, there does not seem to be any training
currently taking place in the United States.  The “jury” is out
regarding the effectiveness of eliciting confessions using the
PEACE approach versus the traditional Reid method.  Never-
theless, there have been no reported false confessions obtained
using the PEACE method.
TYPES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS
A number of different models have been developed to
explain why people falsely confess.  These models have been
given different names and combined and/or separated into
various permutations.  The following is not meant to imply
these are the only reasons why someone may falsely confess.
Rather, it is to provide five descriptive examples to help
explain why some people may confess to crimes they did not
commit.  
Kassin and Wrightsman identity three types of false confes-
sions:22 (1) voluntary false confession, whereby a suspect con-
fesses willingly because of a need for notoriety, need to protect
a friend or relative, or a pathological need to be punished; (2)
coerced-compliant false confession, in which the suspect con-
fesses to escape or avoid the stressful interrogation process or to
achieve some immediate goal, such as less punishment (implied
by the police) or a reward for cooperation (e.g., phone call to a
wife, cigarette break, etc.); and (3) coerced-internalized false
confession, in which a suspect, after being subjected to intense
pressure and suggestion by police, begins to internalize or
believe falsely that he or she committed the crime. Often indi-
viduals do not trust their own memories because they may have
been high on drugs or were in a psychotic state around the time
period of the offense.  McCann identifies another category, the
coerced-reactive false confession, in which the suspect confesses
due to threats or pressure from an outside entity, such as a fel-
low gang member or an abusive spouse.23 A final category is the
coerced-substituted false confession, in which a suspect has com-
mitted a finite number of similar offenses (e.g., stealing cars,
burglaries) within a short, specific time period, yet confesses to
a greater number of like offenses than actually committed
because he or she does not remember the specifics of each and
every offense.24 This at times can be explained in light of the
police questioning the suspect about many unsolved cases,
some of which were not committed by the suspect but some of
which were.
RISK FACTORS FOR FALSE CONFESSIONS
Research has shown a number of risk factors associated
with those who are susceptible to interrogative influence and,
by extension, are at greater risk for giving a false confession (or
a confession that, while essentially true, places the defendant
in a more responsible or aggravating situation than warranted).
Research summarized by Gudjonsson has shown that low
intelligence, anxiety, memory impairment, sleep deprivation,
and certain personality characteristics (including compliance,
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acquiescence, poor assertiveness, and suggestibility) place an
individual at risk of succumbing to police demands.25
Juveniles are particularly vulnerable to interrogation tactics.
They are more apt to make decisions based on immediate gain
rather than looking at long-term consequences of a behavior.
Law enforcement is allowed to use deception as part of the
interrogation, such as lying about evidence and misrepresent-
ing the nature or seriousness of the charges.  Although police
officers are not allowed to make direct promises regarding
leniency, they are allowed to imply that if the individual coop-
erates, he or she will get a lesser sentence.  As Drizen and Leo
discuss, the expectation that giving a confession will result in
release is a common explanation as to why juveniles end up
confessing. 
The prefrontal cortex is one of the last areas of the brain to
mature. It is responsible for cognition, abstract reasoning, deci-
sion making, and the modulation of appropriate behavior in
social situations.  It integrates information from all the senses
to direct thoughts and behaviors toward a specific goal.26 Juve-
niles are less able to reasonably evaluate consequences of their
behaviors compared to adults.  The prefrontal cortex needs to
be fully developed to make the types of complex decisions nec-
essary during an interrogation, such as whether to waive one’s
Miranda rights and/or give a confession—true, partially true, or
false. 
Kassin and Kiechel27 demonstrated in the laboratory the
false-confession phenomenon by convincing college under-
graduates they accidently caused a computer to crash by hitting
the Alt key on a keyboard during a computer-based task.
These false-confession studies were replicated by a number of
researchers, including Redlich and Goodman.28 They demon-
strated that age was correlated with signing a false statement
with concomitant negative consequences (i.e., spending an
additional ten hours retyping the material). There are prob-
lems with extrapolating this research to real-life interrogations.
First, in the criminal and juvenile contexts, punishment is
more serious than ten hours of data entry. Second, research
participants were convinced they accidently, rather than pur-
posely, committed the infraction.  As Redlich and Goodman
point out, the results of these studies replicate those involving
the suggestibility of child witnesses in that: (a) juveniles are
more suggestible than adults, (b) young children, particularly
those under the age of 14, understand legal concepts less well
than adults,29 and (c) leading and suggestive repetitive inter-
views lead to inaccurate and false reports. Juveniles are sub-
stantially more vulnerable than adults to police influence and
in giving false confessions.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUA-
TION AND SUBSEQUENT
EXPERT TESTIMONY
The Reid interrogation method
and its various offshoots are highly
effective and serve the purpose of
getting truly guilty individuals to
confess.  Unfortunately, a major
problem with these techniques is
that there are certain vulnerable
individuals who may confess not
because they committed the offense, but because they are
overly susceptible to giving in to these interrogation methods.
It is a proper role for a mental health professional to describe
the specific psychological characteristics of a defendant, how
those characteristics interact and are influenced during the
interrogation, and how they may influence the validity or reli-
ability of statements given to law enforcement compared to the
average person.
In alleged false- or coerced-confession cases, a mental
health professional needs to conduct a comprehensive clinical
and psychosocial interview with a special focus on obtaining
the defendant’s version of what transpired during the interro-
gation.  In addition, psychological tests are administered to
more objectively assess those psychological vulnerabilities
which have been known to be associated with a higher risk of
succumbing to police demands and/or providing false state-
ments.  Such evaluations usually include intelligence, person-
ality, and malingering tests.
One important test is the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale30
(GSS) to specifically measure interrogative suggestibility. Inter-
rogative suggestibility has been defined as the extent to which
an individual comes to accept messages or information com-
municated during formal questioning as true.31 Although not
administered as a test of memory, the GSS is presented to the
defendant as such.  The test involves the reading of a complex
narrative story containing 40 bits of factual information.  After
the story is read, the subject is asked to recall everything he or
she remembers about the story. Generally, after a 50-minute
delay, the defendant is again asked to recall the story’s details.
Then 20 standardized questions are asked about the story, 15
of which are designed to be leading or misleading.  A Yield 1
score is subsequently obtained. This is the number of times the
subject yields to the leading questions.  Regardless of perfor-
mance, the individual is firmly told he or she has made a num-
ber of errors and that it is necessary to go over each question
again and to be “more accurate.”  Then the 20 questions are
repeated.  A second yield score, Yield 2, is obtained.  A third
measure, Shift, is obtained, which is the number of times an
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individual shifts from one
response (right or wrong) to a dif-
ferent response.  A Total Sug-
gestibility Score is also calculated,
which is the sum of Yield 1 and
Shift.  The results of this test are
directly relevant to how sug-
gestible an individual is to police
interrogations—that is, how fre-
quently the defendant gives in to
leading questions and shifts to
different responses under pres-
sure. The GSS provides one piece
of data which may be relevant to addressing issues pertaining
to the validity or voluntariness of a confession.  Results from
the GSS become relevant only if law enforcement provides mis-
leading information to the suspect or pressures that suspect
into changing his or her response.  Research has shown that
Yield 1 is influenced by cognitive variables, while Yield 2 and
Shift are more impacted by personality variables.32
Gudjonsson33 summarizes the research regarding sug-
gestibility and juveniles. Children who are 12 years of age and
older, although no more likely to give in to leading questions
than adults, are more affected by negative feedback or inter-
rogative pressure to change their responses.  Younger children
are more suggestible than older children and tend to be not
only more susceptible to negative feedback and pressure but
also more likely to yield to leading questions, in comparison
with both older juveniles and adults.  This has implications as
to how juveniles are interrogated.34
Gudjonsson also developed the Gudjonsson Compliance
Scale (GCS) as a 20-item self-report measure to complement
the GSS.  Compliance differs from suggestibility because the
individual does not have to privately accept the premise pre-
sented by police officers as true.  On the test, the subject
responds True or False to each of 20 items (e.g., I give in eas-
ily when I am pressured).  There is a companion version of the
test to administer to those who know the subject well.  The
problem with the GCS is that there is no way to assess if the
respondent is presenting him or herself accurately or is pur-
posely or unconsciously minimizing or exaggerating compli-
ance.  This is not a problem for the GSS because it is relatively
immune from malingering.  For example, in a study by Baxter
and Bain,35 an experimental group was told before administer-
ing the test that their suggestibility was to be measured.  This
group was told to feign suggestibility.  Only the Yield 1 score
on the test was affected.
Psychological testimony should serve the purpose of edu-
cating the jury about risk factors within the individual and the
interrogation process itself that could increase the likelihood
of a false or involuntary confession.  It is not proper for the
expert to opine whether the confession was coerced, involun-
tary, false, likely false, or even true.  Testimony related to psy-
chological characteristics of a defendant in interaction with
interrogative tactics assists in determining the weight to be
given to the voluntariness or validity of a confession.  This type
of testimony has been accepted in many jurisdictions through-
out the country.  When testimony has not been allowed, it is
generally because the mental health expert had planned on
addressing the ultimate legal issue as to whether the defendant
gave a false or involuntary confession or because relevancy for
the particular case was not established. 
A defendant might be highly suggestible, the police might
have been overly coercive in their interrogation methods (it is
for the court to draw the line as to whether the police crossed
a legal threshold in their methods of extracting a Miranda
waiver or confession), or an interactive combination of the
two.  Yet, a suggestible defendant may have committed an
offense and nonetheless retracted a true confession.    Expert
testimony is designed to provide specialized knowledge to the
trier of fact so a determination can be made as to how much
weight to give to the confession or the effects of the interroga-
tion on the defendant, not to provide an opinion on the valid-
ity of the confession itself.  Testimony can also be provided as
to the effects of particular interrogation techniques on people
in general and on the defendant in particular and how those
procedures can produce false confessions.
It is problematic when the mental health professional places
undue and inappropriate weight on the GSS and other test
scores (such as IQ) to opine that the defendant was likely to
have given a false confession.  Rather, it is preferable to discuss
how such psychological factors increase the likelihood of a false
confession compared to the average person.  Testimony when
worded in relative terms (e.g., the person’s psychological func-
tioning compared to others, which heightens the risk of a false
confession) or in explanatory terms (e.g., if this person did not
do the crime, why he or she may have said they did so), provides
useful information to the trier of fact in deciding how much
weight to give to self-incriminating statements.  There is a
greater chance this testimony would be admitted because it is
specialized knowledge that assists the trier of fact and does not
invade the province of the jury.  Many clinicians blur the bound-
aries between their roles and that of the trier of fact.  When this
happens, such testimony is oftentimes not allowed at trial.
Some argue that the GSS should only be used in cases in
which a suspect erroneously believed he or she committed the
crime: a coerced-internalized false-confession scenario.  Fur-
ther, some suggest GSS is not relevant for the type of confes-
sion in which a suspect confesses due to pressure from police
or from others because these suspects know whether or not
they committed the crime, and their “autobiographical mem-
ory” was not impaired.36 This is a fallacy because the Shift
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66. State v. Wright, 247 S.W.3d 161 (Mo. App. 2008).
67. State v. Free, 351 N.J.Super. 203, 798 A.2d 83 (2002).
68. United States v. Dixon, 261 Fed. Appx. 800 (5th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Antone, 412 Fed. Appx. 10 (9th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Benally, 541 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 2008). See
also Belyea, 159 Fed. Appx. at 529–30 (trial court should have
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69. United States v. Jacques, 784 F.Supp.2d 59 (D.Mass. 2011).
70. United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278 (U.S.A.F. 1999).
71. Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider, & Steven A. Drizin, Scrutiniz-
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score is much less influenced by memory processes than the
Yield score.  There is also a correlation between compliance
and suggestibility.  Finally, as with all test data, the results must
be interpreted by the totality of the circumstances for a partic-
ular defendant in the context of a specific case and its facts. 
RECENT RULINGS ON ADMISSIBILITY OF FALSE-CON-
FESSION, EXPERT TESTIMONY
Case law has been mixed regarding the admissibility of
expert testimony on false confessions in general or the use of
the GSS in particular.37 Several courts support the position that
such expert evidence both in juvenile and adult cases adds crit-
ical evidence to the jury’s determination of whether a confes-
sion might be false. In a seminal case, nearly two decades ago,
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Hall38 found that
although a trial court may exclude “expert testimony that may
in some way overlap with matters within the jury’s experi-
ence,”39 the court’s determination that the sociological expert’s
“testimony would add nothing to what the jury would know
from common experience”40 was an insufficient basis to pre-
vent the jury from considering valid social science evidence.41
Two other federal circuits have issued decisions similar to
Hall,42 as have the Federal District Court of New Mexico43 and
nine states: California,44 Colorado,45 Florida,46 Indiana,47 Ken-
tucky,48 Nebraska,49 New York,50 North Carolina,51 and Utah.52
However, courts have not unequivocally allowed expert tes-
timony, with the majority of exclusions based on the helpful-
ness of the expert testimony to the
trier of fact. In People v. Bennet,53
for example, a trial court refused
to allow expert testimony (by this
author) concerning a defendant’s
suggestibility because the trial
court decided (and the Illinois
Appellate Court upheld) that
interrogative suggestibility “was
not beyond the common knowl-
edge of lay persons and would not
aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusions.”54 Furthermore,
the defendant’s suggestibility was not tied to a diagnosed men-
tal illness.55 Similarly, 12 other states—Alaska,56 Arkansas,57
Georgia,58 Iowa,59 Kansas,60 Louisiana,61 Maine,62 Massachu-
setts,63 Michigan,64 Minnesota,65 Missouri,66 and New
Jersey67—three of the federal circuits,68 the Federal District
Court in Massachusetts,69 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces70 have rejected expert testimony as unreliable or
usurping the function of the jury. Nevertheless, as suggested
elsewhere in this issue, the vast majority of commentators who
have examined the issue believe trial courts “should be open to
hearing from an expert on police interrogations of juveniles as
they consider the police tactics used and the ultimate volun-
tariness of the confession, and the same is true for adults.”71
As might be anticipated in light of the overall mixed recep-
tivity by courts to expert evidence in general regarding confes-
“[E]xpert 
evidence... 
adds critical
evidence [about]
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assist the jury in its decision making. 383 S.W.3d at 342–44. The
Vance opinion did not reference Misskelley. Taken together, the
two cases appear to support the proposition that the trial court has
a lot of discretion in determining whether and what expert evi-
dence will be helpful to the jury.
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85. Id. at 1081. The judge had in fact excluded the expert’s (this
author’s) testimony regarding the defendant’s confession suscepti-
bility based on the GSS. Id. at 1076. However, the judge’s analysis
regarding whether the GSS met the Frye admissibility standard
was flawed. Id. at 1080–81. Nevertheless, the judge’s ruling in not
allowing the expert testimony was harmless because of other per-
tinent facts beyond the defendant’s confession and potential sug-
gestibility. Id. at 1082.
86. United States v. Deuman, 892 F.Supp.2d 881 (W.D. Mich. 2012).
87. Id. at 886.
88. Id. at 888, 890–91.
89. Courts typically allow “false confession expert testimony to
explain how a defendant’s mental illness or retardation or person-
ality trait rendered the defendant more susceptible to coercion or
persuasion.” Id. at 887, citing, among other supporting case law,
the federal circuit court opinions from the First (Shay) and Sev-
enth (Hall) Circuits.
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sions, courts’ allowances/exclu-
sions of testimony based on the
GSS have been similarly mixed.
In Misskelley v. State,72 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas upheld the trial court’s
ruling to disallow a clinical psy-
chologist to testify based on the
GSS.73 The psychologist was
allowed to testify that the juvenile
defendant was “quite suggestible,” however.74 Thus, the trial
court did allow the psychologist and another expert, a sociol-
ogist, to offer their expert opinions about the voluntariness of
the defendant’s confession.75 Similarly, in Commonwealth v.
Soares,76 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts upheld a motion
judge’s decision not to accord any weight to a psychologist’s
testimony regarding the defendant’s confession as part of the
defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to police.77 The
psychologist appeared unaware of the purpose of the GSS, stat-
ing that the GSS results would not apply to a custodial situa-
tion if “the interrogation was devoid of physical force” or
shouting.78
The GSS was judged to meet Daubert79 and Frye80 standards
of admissibility in United States v. Raposo81 and People v. Nel-
son.82 In Raposo, the Federal District Court rejected the gov-
ernment’s request to exclude expert testimony on false confes-
sions and the GSS83 because it was deemed relevant to the fac-
tual question of both the falsity and the voluntariness of the
confession.84 In Nelson, the Illinois Supreme Court noted the
trial court found the GSS was generally accepted in the scien-
tific community, thus meeting the Frye test for admissibility.85
Finally, a reoccurring issue courts have focused on is the fit
of the expert testimony to the case facts. In United States v. Deu-
man,86 a false-confession expert’s testimony was ruled inad-
missible. The problem was not that the expert’s theories were
problematic as a general matter; rather, they were deemed
“unreliable and irrelevant” to the specific facts at issue in the
case.87 Coupled with the risk that the expert’s testimony of the
possibility of a coerced confession would be especially persua-
sive to the jury,88 the proffered testimony was excluded.  In its
analysis, the court distinguished the proffered testimony in
this case from cases where the expert testimony is intended to
assist the fact finder in understanding how the defendant’s psy-
chology makes him or her especially susceptible to making a
false confession.89 Similar to Deuman, an Oregon trial court
disallowed GSS testimony not because the judge felt that the
GSS was a poor test but because the court believed “it’s a com-
ment on the evidence, it’s a comment on the voluntariness.”90
However, the Oregon Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial
court and allowed the testimony, stating, “It would have been
probative, relevant, and helpful to the trier of fact.”91
RECOMMENDATIONS
Law enforcement officers in the United States use the Reid
technique or similar interrogation practices to get people
whom they believe are guilty of a crime to confess.  It is an
effective method to get guilty people to confess to crimes, in
that half of criminal cases involve a confession.92 Whether it is
fair to use deceit and psychologically coercive procedures to
extract confessions is both a societal and moral issue. Public
safety concerns as well as punishment for those who do not
uphold the law generally trump, in many peoples’ minds, con-
cerns for how confessions are obtained, as long as the interro-
gation does not involve physical coercion or extreme depriva-
tion.
The problem is that there are certain vulnerable people who
may confess to a crime they did not commit because of these
very interrogation tactics designed to get guilty people to con-
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fess.  Such vulnerabilities include low intelligence, anxiety,
memory problems, acquiescence, suggestibility, compliance,
and sleep deprivation. Juveniles and young adults are particu-
larly susceptible to false confessions.  Although the PEACE
model for investigative interviews seems to rarely produce
false confessions, it is not yet known whether the guilty con-
fess when the PEACE model is used at the same rate as when
the Reid technique is used.
Mental health testimony about an individual’s vulnerability
to interrogation tactics that might produce a false or partially
false confession can provide the trier of fact with important
information to assist in deciding how much weight should be
given to the confession. The testimony must consist of spe-
cialized knowledge and be relevant to how the confession was
ultimately obtained.
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